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Abstract
We study a competitive electricity market equilibrium with two trading stages, day-ahead and real-time. The welfare of
each market agent is exposed to uncertainty (here from renewable energy production), while agent information on the
probability distribution of this uncertainty is not identical at the day-ahead stage. We show a high sensitivity of the
equilibrium solution to the level of information asymmetry and demonstrate economic, operational, and computational
value for the system stemming from potential information sharing.
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Uniqueness, Uncertainty
1. Introduction
With increasing shares of renewable energy resources,
electricity markets are exposed to uncertainty associated
with intermittent power supply. To accommodate this un-
certainty, electricity trading in short term has been ar-
ranged in several subsequent trading floors, such as day-
ahead and real-time markets. At the first stage (day-
ahead), market agents, such as power producers and con-
sumers, compete to contract energy considering the fore-
cast of renewable power production, while at the second
stage (real-time) they settle power imbalances caused by
forecast errors.
Such competition can be modeled as a stochastic equi-
librium problem in the sense of [1], where each market
agent is a self-optimizer and maximizes its welfare, e.g.
expected profit for producers or expected utility for con-
sumers. Each agent computes a day-ahead decision while
anticipating the real-time outcomes using its private infor-
mation (e.g., probabilistic forecast) about uncertainty. To
find the equilibrium among such agents, distributed algo-
rithms as in [2] have been proposed to let agents integrate
their private forecasts. After a finite number of iterations,
the agents find a set of equilibrium prices that reflect their
private information and support the equilibrium. This dis-
tributed solution is promising for the operation of local
markets [3] or parts of larger systems [4].
In contrast, large electricity markets, such as NordPool
or CAISO, use a centralized optimization to compute the
equilibrium, where the central entity called market opera-
tor collects bids from agents and clears the market on its
own. To efficiently operate markets with renewables, it
has been proposed to cast the centralized optimization as
a two-stage stochastic model [5, 6]. This model considers
that the operator generates a set of plausible renewable
outcomes based on its own information about the prob-
ability distribution of renewable energy production, and
clears the day-ahead market while accounting for the an-
ticipated real-time imbalances.
The important property of the two problems is that
they are equivalent in the case where all market agents in
the equilibrium model optimize against the same proba-
bility distribution as that of the market operator in the
centralized model. Under this scenario, the two problems
yield the same market-clearing results and the centralized
market is complete as it satisfies the preferences of the
agents in the equilibrium problem. However, the equiva-
lence between the centralized and equilibrium problems no
longer holds when agents in the equilibrium problem opti-
mize against different distributions. In this situation, the
centralized market settlement is inefficient as it does not
support the true preferences of agents. We refer to this
situation as information asymmetry that typically holds
for many reasons. Naturally, market agents use different
data and forecast tools to build uncertainty distributions.
Furthermore, for a given set of plausible outcomes, agents
may explicitly assign different probabilities depending on
whether they are rational or not, for example, in the sense
of prospect theory [7].
In this line, this letter analyzes a competition among
electricity market agents that have asymmetric informa-
tion about a common source of uncertainty. We propose
an equilibrium model in which agents may assign different
probabilities over a common set of renewable power pro-
duction outcomes. We show that the centralized model in
[5, 6] satisfies the preferences of all market agents only if
they all agree on the probability distribution of renewable
power production. We discuss the existence and unique-
ness of the solution to the equilibrium problem, and refer
the stability theory to discuss the challenges associated
with its computation. With our analytic results, we point
out a high sensitivity of equilibrium prices to the level of
information asymmetry. We then propose a distributed
algorithm to numerically assess the equilibrium outcomes.
We eventually demonstrate that the system overall ben-
efits from information sharing, as we show that for any
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asymmetry in agents information, there exist a loss of so-
cial welfare, an increase in real-time imbalances, and a
decrease of the convergence rate of the distributed algo-
rithm.
The letter is outlined as follows. In Section 2 we de-
scribe the setup and introduce the stochastic equilibrium
model. We further proceed with an analytic solution to
equilibrium prices as a function of the private informa-
tion of agents in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the
distributed algorithm to compute equilibrium and provide
extensive numerical experiments. All proofs are gathered
in an Appendix.
2. Problem statement
2.1. Main notation and assumptions
We consider a finite set of uncertainty outcomes Ω in-
dexed by ω “ t1, . . . ,Ωu. ξω is the renewable power output
that corresponds to outcome ω. The renewable produc-
ers are not modeled as market agents, but represented as
an aggregated stochastic in-feed. The controllable gener-
ation (consumption) is represented by a single producer
(consumer). The dispatch of power producer at the day-
ahead stage is denoted by p P O, and it can be adjusted
by rω P O in real-time if outcome ω realizes. The set O
denotes the feasible operating region of the producer based
on its technical constraints. The cost function of the pro-
ducer is quadratic given by cpxq “ 12αx2, where α is a
positive constant. The consumer procures energy at the
day-ahead stage in amount of d P K that is subject to ad-
justment lω P K in real-time if outcome ω realizes. The
set K exhibits the feasible region of the decision-making
problem of the consumer. The utility of the consumer is
described by concave function upxq “ γx ´ 12βx2, where
γ and β are positive constants. We assume that both O
and K are convex and compact sets. The dual price in
scenario ω is denoted by λω in the optimization problem.
Its counterpart in the equilibrium problem is denoted by
λ˜ω. In this work, we do not consider network, subsidies
and unit commitment constraints, that often cause nega-
tive electricity prices [8], and exclusively focus on perfect
competition. Therefore, both λω and λ˜ω belong to a com-
pact set of non-negative reals Λ`.
2.2. Centralized model for market-clearing problem
Consider a centralized market organization, where the
market operator collects bids of agents and finds socially
optimal contracts tp, du at the day-ahead stage, followed
by real-time recourse decisions trω, lωu@ω. The market op-
erator integrates its own information about underlying un-
certainty that is described by a finite set of probabilities
tpimoω u@ω assigned to uncertain outcomes. This yields
max
p,rω,d,lω
“
updq ´ cppq‰` ÿ
ωPΩ
pimoω
“
uplωq ´ cprωq
‰
, (1a)
s.t. p` rω ` ξω ´ d´ lω ě 0 : λω, @ω P Ω, (1b)
pp, rωq P O, pd, lωq P K, @ω P Ω, (1c)
where objective function (1a) represents the expected so-
cial welfare seen by the market operator, and constraint
(1b) enforces the power balance for each outcome of re-
newable energy production. A set of dual prices tλωu@ω
shows the sensitivity of the expected social welfare to the
stochastic in-feed and, therefore, is an implicit function
of the information of market operator. Hence, the out-
comes for market participants are subject to the informa-
tion available to the market operator.
Remark 1. As dual prices fall into non-negative domain,
(1b) is cast as an inequality constraint that is binding in
optimum. If one allows for negative prices, (1b) has to be
specified as an equality constraint.
Remark 2. The real-time electricity price in outcome ω
anticipated by the market operator at the day-ahead stage
is the probability-removed price λωpimoω
[5].
Remark 3. Unlike settings in [5, 6], we do not explicitly
model the day-ahead power balance constraint. Instead, we
use the notion of price convergence between day-ahead and
real-time stages [9] to obtain the day-ahead electricity price
as λDA “ Σωpimoω λωpimoω “ Σωλω.
2.3. Equilibrium model for market-clearing problem
We now introduce an equilibrium model given by a set
of individual optimization of three agents, i.e.,
max
λ˜ωPΛ`
Jpsω :“ ´λ˜ω
“
p` rω ` ξω ´ d´ lω
‰
, @ω P Ω, (2a)
max
pp,rωqPO
Jp :“
ÿ
ωPΩ
pipω
«
λ˜ω
pipω
pp` rωq ´ cprωq
ff
´ cppq, (2b)
max
pd,lωqPK
Jc :“
ÿ
ωPΩ
picω
«
uplωq ´ λ˜ω
picω
pd` lωq
ff
` updq, (2c)
The price-setting agent solves (2a) and optimizes a
set of equilibrium prices tλ˜ωu@ω in response to the value
of the system imbalance for each outcome of renewable
production. For any surplus of generation, problem (2a)
yields zero price, while it yields a strictly positive price
in case of generation shortage. The power producer op-
timizes its first- and second-stage decisions p and trωu@ω
in (2b) to maximize the expected profit for a given set of
prices tλ˜ωu@ω. In its optimization, the producer integrates
its own information about the uncertain in-feed character-
ized by a finite set of probabilities tpipωu@ω. Finally, the
consumer computes optimal first-stage and recourse deci-
sions d and tlωu@ω in (2c) to maximize its expected util-
ity using its own information set tpicωu@ω. Observe, that
agents in (2b) and (2c) use the probability-removed prices
obtained by dividing the equilibrium prices by the asso-
ciated probabilities [5]. The probability-removed prices
define the actual electricity price that each agent expects
to receive once uncertainty is resolved.
The three problems are interconnected in the sense that
the problem of the price-setter is parametrized by the deci-
sions of the producer and consumer, while their problems
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are conditioned by the price provided by the price-setting
agent. Similarly to the centralized problem (1a), equilib-
rium prices provide the sensitivity of the expected social
welfare with respect to the marginal change in random
in-feed. Therefore, a set of equilibrium prices tλ˜ωu@ω is
implicitly a function of the information that agents inte-
grate into their optimization problems.
Proposition 1. The solution to the equilibrium problem
(2) exists and is unique for any agent information sets.
Remark 4. The proof of Proposition 1 relies on the strict
monotonicity of agent preferences. In the case of linear
preferences, other approaches would be required (see [10,
Chapter 2]).
2.4. Relation between centralized and equilibrium models
The equivalence between the centralized and equilib-
rium market-clearing models is established with the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 2. Let pimoω “ pipω “ picω,@ω P Ω. Then, there
exists a set of prices tλ˜‹ωu@ω that yields the optimal solution
p‹, d‹, tr‹ω, l‹ωu@ω in the equilibrium model (2) that solves
the centralized model (1). Moreover, λ˜‹ω “ λ‹ω,@ω.
However, this equivalence no longer holds when the in-
formation of market agents about the renewable in-feed in
the equilibrium model is different from that of the market
operator in the centralized model. In this scenario, the
prices in (1) and (2) are not necessarily identical as they
depend on different information sets, making the market
based on (1) incomplete in terms of information. In the
following we study model (2) that reveals the true equi-
librium state among agents with private information on
uncertainty. Eventually, we show that the system overall
benefits when agents agree on a common information set
that completes the market.
3. Analytic solution for equilibrium prices
Let us define the demand excess function for renewable
power outcome ω as zω “ d` lω ´ p´ rω ´ ξω. We derive
the optimality conditions associated with (2b) and (2c) to
define variables d, lω, p, and rω as a function of equilibrium
prices λ˜. Assuming the agent constraints are not binding,
the demand excess function writes as:
zωpλ˜q “ γ ´ Σωλ˜ω
β
` pi
c
ωγ ´ λ˜ω
picωβ
´ Σωλ˜ω
α
´ λ˜ω
pipωα
´ ξω.
By solving zωpλ˜q “ 0,@ω P Ω, we obtain a closed-form
characterization of equilibrium prices as a function of prob-
abilities that agents assign to uncertain outcomes. In the
interest of illustration, let us consider a set Ω P th, `u with
only two outcomes with ξ` “ 1 and ξh “ 3. For any agent
it holds that pi``pih “ 1. Let α “ 1.5, β “ 0.3, and γ “ 5.
Figure 1 depicts the two equilibrium prices λ˜` and λ˜h as a
function of pi` and pih . We find a clear relationship between
the equilibrium prices and agent information. For instance
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Figure 1: Prices as a function of probabilities that agents assign to the two uncertainty outcomes
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Figure 1: Equilibrium prices λ˜` and λ˜h as a function of probabili-
ties that agents assign to the two uncertainty outcomes. The black
markers indicate the three boundary equilibrium cases.
(a) pip` “ 0.5, pic` “ 0.5 (b) pip` “ 0.99, pic` “ 0.5
Figure 2: Equilibrium point and vector field around equilibrium
point in case of (a) symmetric and (b) asymmetric information.
in case (N), when producer assigns the whole probability
mass to outcome `, it leads to a nearly zero price associated
with outcome h. A similar situation holds in the opposite
case (‹). In a quite critical case () with highly asym-
metric assignment of probabilities, the equilibrium yields
almost zero prices for both outcomes. Moreover, we find
that the day-ahead price, i.e., λ˜DA “ λ˜` ` λ˜h, attains its
maximum value when both agents have symmetric infor-
mation, i.e., pip` “ pic` .
As shown in [2], the unstable equilibrium may not be
computable by standard distributed algorithms. To ver-
ify the stability of the equilibrium solution under different
assignments of probabilities, we consider a dynamic price
adjustment process as the following first order differential
equation [11]:
dλ˜ptq
dt
“ τzpλ˜ptqq, λ˜p0q “ λ˜0, (3)
where τ is some positive constant, and λ˜0 is a vector of
initial prices. We discuss the stability of the equilibrium
solution using the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Adapted from [12]). If λ˜ is a solution
of (3) and all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of z
have strictly negative real parts, then λ˜ is locally stable. If
at least one eigenvalue has strictly positive real part, then
λ˜ is unstable.
By verifying the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of z, we
find that for any assignment of probabilities, the equilib-
rium solution is locally stable and, thus, supposedly com-
putable. However, we observe that for asymmetric cases
the ratio of the two eigenvalues significantly increases. This
ratio heavily affects the convergence rate for gradient search
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algorithms [13], as illustrated by vector fields in Figure 2
for some choice of λ˜0. In particular, in Figure 2(a), a gra-
dient search is almost uniform in both directions λ˜` and
λ˜h, while in Figure 2(b) the gradient in direction λ˜` is no-
tably smaller than that in direction λ˜h. In the following
section, we will demonstrate that the high eigenvalue ra-
tios significantly affect the convergence of the distributed
market-clearing algorithms.
4. Equilibrium computation
In this section, we first introduce a distributed algo-
rithm to compute the solution to the equilibrium problem.
We then describe the setup and provide numerical results.
4.1. Algorithm
To compute the equilibrium solution, we use a dis-
tributed algorithm that naturally embodies the Walrasian
tatonnement [14]. The price-setter problem (2a) updates
the prices based on the optimal response of the producer
and consumer optimization problems (2b) and (2c), re-
spectively.
We first show that the price-setter optimization (2a)
reduces to a single analytic expression.
Proposition 4. Consider the response of producer pν , trνωu@ω
and the response of consumer dν , tlνωu@ω to a set of prices
tλ˜ν´1ω u@ω at some iteration ν. Then, the solution of (2a)
converges to optimum over iterations using
λ˜νω “ max
!
0, λ˜ν´1ω ´ ρ
“
pν ` rνω ` ξω ´ dν ´ lνω
‰)
, @ω P Ω,
for some positive constant ρ.
Using an analytic expression for the price-update, we
can compute the solution of the equilibrium problem (2)
using Algorithm 1. As objective function of each agent is
strictly monotone in decision variables and its feasibility
set is convex and compact, the algorithm provably con-
verges to the global optimum for ν Ñ 8 with rate Op 1ν q,
given that the solution exists [15]. The algorithm is imple-
mented in JuMP environment [16] in Julia, and the source
code is available in the e-companion [17].
4.2. Setup
We choose α “ 1.5, γ “ 5, β “ 0.3, tλ˜0ωu@ω “ 0,
ρ “  “ 10´5. The outcomes of uncertain renewable pro-
duction are described by 100 samples drawn from a nor-
mal distribution N pµ, σ2q with µ “ 1.5 and σ2 “ 0.25.
The rationale behind these parameters lies in the fact that
the producer and consumer are willing to trade energy
for any realization of wind power production, whereas the
wind fluctuations bring about observable impacts on the
market-clearing outcomes. The practical choice of these
parameters is subject to the specifics of a given power sys-
tem, e.g. cost/utility structure and wind penetration level.
We consider the reference distribution R that assigns
equally likely probabilities over 100 samples. We then gen-
erate a series of distributions that tweak either mean or
Data: νMAX, ρ, λ˜
0
ω @ω, 
for ν from 1 to νMAX do
1 For tλ˜ν´1ω u@ω, update producer response
pν , trνωu@ω Ð argmaxpp,rωqPO
Jppp, rωq
2 For tλ˜ν´1ω u@ω, update consumer response
dν , tlνωu@ω Ð argmaxpd,lωqPK
Jcpd, lωq
3 For pν , trνωu@ω and dν , tlνωu@ω, update prices:
λ˜νω “ max
!
0, λ˜ν´1ω ´ ρ
“
pν ` rνω ` ξω ´ dν ´ lνω
‰)
4 Return -equilibrium prices and dispatch if:∥∥pν ` rνω ` ξω ´ dν ´ lνω∥∥2 ď , @ω P Ω,
otherwise go to 1 .
end
Algorithm 1: Solution algorithm
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of distributions: µ -labeled distribu-
tions primarily tweak the mean of the reference distribution R , while
σ -labeled distributions primarily tweak the variance of R .
Label µ Ò
3
µ Ò
2
µ Ò
1
R µ Ó
1
µ Ó
2
µ Ó
3
µ 2.02 1.79 1.65 1.56 1.34 1.22 1.07
σ2 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.27
Label σ Ò3 σ
Ò
2 σ
Ò
1 R σ
Ó
1 σ
Ó
2 σ
Ó
3
µ 1.63 1.60 1.57 1.56 1.55 1.55 1.56
σ2 1.62 0.92 0.54 0.33 0.10 0.04 0.02
variance of the reference distribution R using the proba-
bility weighting function of the following form [18, Eq.(3)]:
Φpξq “ δ
“
ΦR pξq‰γ
δ
“
ΦR pξq‰γ ` “1´ ΦR pξq‰γ , (4)
where Φ represents the cumulative distribution function of
stochastic renewable production, δ P R` primarily affects
the mean of the reference distribution R , and γ P R`
primarily impacts the variance. By applying (4) to the
reference distribution for different δ and γ, we obtain a
collection of probability assignments to the same set of
outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the distributions that we
use in the following analysis.
In our setup, consumer always optimizes against the
reference distribution R , while producer optimizes against
one of the distributions in Table 1. When producer uses
R in its local optimization, the equilibrium solution cor-
responds to the symmetric case, and any deviation from
R corresponds to the asymmetric equilibrium.
4.3. Numerical results
We first consider the impact of information asymmetry
on the electricity price at the day-ahead stage depicted in
Figure 3. We see that it is maximized when the two agents
4
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Figure 3: Impacts of information asymmetry on the day-ahead price.
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Figure 4: Impacts of information asymmetry on the contracted quan-
tities of consumer (d) and producer (p) at the day-ahead stage.
use the same uncertainty distribution R . Any deviation
from R in producer optimization decreases the day-ahead
price. The resulting price-supported day-ahead contracts
illustrated in Figure 4 show that such deviations in terms
of either mean or variance lead to increasing power mis-
match between controllable generation and consumption.
Next, we compute the realization of the social welfare
for each uncertainty outcome for the fixed day-ahead deci-
sions of the producer and consumer. They are computed
considering symmetric information and some asymmetric
information cases. The results are summarized in Figure
5. We observe that the social welfare improves in larger
realizations of renewable output, and records the maxi-
mum when producer employs R . For any deviation of the
producer from the reference distribution, we find a social
loss, that is smaller for deviations in terms of the mean
rather than variance for given distributions. Moreover, we
see the welfare reduces more significantly if the producer
assigns smaller variance relatively to that of the consumer.
Finally, we show how the computational performance
of the algorithm is affected by the asymmetry of informa-
tion. Table 2 collects the number of iterations required
by the algorithm to converge along with the ratio between
the largest and the smallest eigenvalues of Jacobian of the
demand excess function. We see that apart from the case
of µ Ò
1
distribution, the asymmetry of agent information
yields larger ratio of eigenvalues, and thus requires more
iterations to converge. Moreover, for a highly asymmetric
case of a low-variance distribution σ Ó3, this ratio boosts
so that the algorithm does not converge for any iteration
limit. The computational time of each iteration, though,
is not affected by information asymmetry and kept below
a few milliseconds for all distributions.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Appendix A.1. Preliminaries
We connect the solution of the equilibrium problem to
the solution of variational inequalities.
Definition 1. Consider a mapping F : Rn Ñ Rn and a
set K Ď R. A solution set SOL(K,F ) to the variational
inequality problem VI(K,F ) is a vector x‹ P K such that
xF px‹q, x´ x‹y ě 0, @x P K.
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Figure 5: Social welfare for each outcome of renewable production. It is defined as a total system surplus for the fixed day-ahead decisions,
i.e., SWω “ “upd‹q ´ cpp‹q‰ ` “uplωq ´ cprωq‰. The 100 outcomes are ordered from the smallest to largest. The colored area between the
curves shows the welfare loss caused by asymmetry of information.
We use the results from [10] to establish the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution.
Theorem 1 (Corollary 2.2.5 [10]). Suppose that K is a
compact and convex set, and that the mapping F is contin-
uous. Then, the set SOL(K,F ) is nonempty and compact.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1.3.1 [10]). Let F : U Ñ R be con-
tinuously differentiable on the open convex set U Ď R. The
following three statements are equivalent: (a) there exists
a real-valued function θ such that F pxq “ ∇θpxq @x P U ;
(b) the Jacobian matrix of F pxq is symmetric @x P U ; (c)
F is integrable on U .
In terms of equilibrium problem (2), K “ OˆKˆΛ`,
vector x “ rp, r, d, l, λ˜sJ, and
FJ “ r∇pJppp,rq ∇rJppp,rq ∇dJcpd,lq ∇lJcpd,lq ∇λ˜Jpspλ˜q s,
where symbols in bold are properly dimensioned vectors.
Appendix A.2. Proof
1 Existence. Recall that by definition O, K and Λ`
are convex and compact. The map F is continuous as
agents’ objective functions are differentiable. Thus, the
solution to equilibrium exists by Theorem 1.
2 Uniqueness. We rely on the symmetry principle
that states that if Jacobian of F is symmetric, there exists
an equivalent optimization problem that solves VI(K,F ).
The Jacobian writes as:
∇xF pxq “
¨˚
˚˝˚αp 0 0 0 ´10 αpipJr 0 0 ´1
0 0 βd 0 1
0 0 0 βpicJl 1
1 1 ´1 ´1 0
‹˛‹‹‚,
which includes a symmetric part with entries correspond-
ing to the elements of variable set x1 “ tp, r, d, lu. We
further observe that ∇x1F px1q is continuous in x1, thus the
conditions (b,c) of Theorem 2 hold for the symmetric part,
such that there exists a function θpx1q given by
θpx1q “
ż 1
0
F px10 ` tpx1 ´ x10qqJpx1 ´ x10qdt
x10Ñ0“
ż 1
0
¨˚
˝tαptαpipJr´γ ` tβd
´γpic ` tβpicJl
‹˛‚
J ¨˚
˝prd
l
‹˛‚dt
“ rαp2 ` Σωpipωαr2ω ` βd2 ` Σωpicωβl2ωs
ż 1
0
tdt
´ rγd` Σωpicωlωs
“ 1
2
αp2 ´ rγd´ 1
2
βd2s ` Σωpipω 12αr
2
ω ´ Σωpicωrγlω ´ 12βl
2
ωs.
If we optimize θpx1q subject to the stationarity conditions
of the price-setting agent, we derive the following opti-
mization:
max
p,rω,d,lω
“
updq ´ cppq‰` ÿ
ωPΩ
picωuplωq ´
ÿ
ωPΩ
pipωcprωq,
(A.1a)
s.t. p` rω ` ξω ´ d´ lω ě 0 : λ˜ω, @ω P Ω, (A.1b)
pp, rωq P O, pd, lωq P K, @ω P Ω, (A.1c)
whose stationarity conditions correspond to those of equi-
librium problem (2). We know that optimization (A.1)
yields a unique solution due to strict concavity of objec-
tive function and convex and compact constraint set. Since
the solution of (A.1) constitutes set SOL(K,F ), the solu-
tion of original equilibrium problem (2) is also unique, as
desired.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2.
Since producer and consumer optimize over indepen-
dent variables, we can optimize problems (2b) and (2c)
jointly. If we constrain the joint problem by the optimal-
ity conditions of price-setter problem (2a), we obtained the
following optimization:
max
p,rω,d,lω
Jppp, rωq ` Jcpd, lωq, (B.1a)
s.t. pp, rωq P O, pd, lωq P K, @ω P Ω, (B.1b)
0 ď p` rω ` ξω ´ d´ lω K λ˜ω ě 0, @ω. (B.1c)
This is equivalent to the optimality condition of the cen-
tralized problem (1) given that expectations over uncertain
renewable production are the same.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 4
The descent direction of the price-setter problem writes
as
´∇λ˜ωJpsω pλ˜ωq “ pν ` rνω ` ξω ´ dν ´ lνω.
Then, the solution of the price-setter problem evolves along
the decent direction with a suitable step size ρ as follows:
λ˜νω “ λ˜ν´1ω ´ ρ∇λ˜ωJpsω pλ˜ωq,
that is bounded from below by zero due to λ˜ω P Λ`.
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